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This paper focuses on the mechanism of money creation in the fractional-
reserve banking system. The aim of this paper is to enlighten the origin of money 
supply, or more precisely to analyse incentives of the institutions participating in 
the process of money creation of the whole money stock. Following from this, the 
paper refers to commercial banks as the most serious destabilizing factor of 
purchasing power of money in the several last decades. Attention is given to 
factors which influence commercial bank to supply credit and also to the factors, 
which create demand for this credit. In its second part the study focuses on the 
failure of incentives resulting from commercial banks actions, which are 
responsible for the continuous decrease of purchasing power of money. The paper 
concludes with alternative proposal of monetary system based on free banking, 
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In the free-market framework, money constitutes a common tool that doesn’t 
serve any single particular objective but continually satisfies an evolving set of 
individual objectives. To fulfil this role efficiently, the value of money must be 
stable or at least predictable. 
It is merely the central bank that is presented by most of the mainstream 
economic studies concerning monetary policy as ”the forth pillar of government 
authority, which strives after designing reliable stabilizing framework for the 
development of purchasing power of national monetary unit”
9. Although in the 
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most developed countries central monetary authorities have privilege and legal 
monopoly to issue notes, the sovereign power over money supply is a subject to 
discussion. Actually, the contemporary monetary arrangements aren’t (obviously) 
based on metallic reserve standard. It follows that not only notes created by the 
central monetary authority generate money supply, but instead, most of it is the 
so-called  inside money, which is issued by private (even if rigidly regulated) 
commercial banks. 
The aim of this paper is to enlighten the origin of money supply, or more 
precisely, to analyse incentives of the institutions accountable for creation of the 
whole money stock, and in this connection to refer to commercial banks as to the 
actual destabilizing factor of purchasing power of money in the several last 
decades. The first chapter enlightens creation of money supply in the past two 
centuries. In this period, significant disturbances of purchasing power of money 
were caused by issuing activity of central banks, which more or less obligatorily 
redeemed governmental securities in order to provide fiscal revenues to 
governments to reimburse war expenditures, and thus caused significant 
fluctuations in purchasing power of money. The second chapter is dedicated to 
particular types of banking operations that result into creation of inside money and 
also focuses on problems of legal inconsistency resulting from these operations. 
The third chapter explains mechanism of money creation through credit activities 
of commercial banks. It targets principally the determinants driving banks either 
to grant or refuse the provision of credit and also focuses on factors that support 
demand for credit. The last chapter is dedicated to the failure of incentives 
resulting from actions of commercial banks that are responsible for chronic 
reduction of purchasing power of money. The paper concludes with alternative 
proposal of monetary system based on free banking being capable of preventing 
the aforementioned failure of commercial banks´ incentives. 
 
Inflation as a way of reimbursing war expenditures 
 
Money inflation as an economic phenomenon by which the purchasing power 
of money decreases is the subject of study of all significant economic schools. As 
it follows from the prekeynesian neoclassical quantitative theory of money, 
decrease in purchasing power of money can be caused by an increase in money 
stock, by a decrease in trustworthiness of the currency or by a decrease in 
economic product on the territory in which the currency is used.  
While governmental authorities may influence the shift in trustworthiness of 
the currency or growth rate of economic product only very indirectly, the size of 
money stock is much more a straight result of the policy of financial institutions,
10 
in particular of the central bank. Therefore, it is not surprising that chronic 
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decrease in purchasing power of money, which typically prevailed in the second 
half of the nineteenth and the first half of the twentieth century, is ascribed chiefly 
to the policies of central monetary institutions. In particular, the periods of war 
and post-war eras of disintegrated countries provide a clear example of direct 
connection between governmental policy and instability of purchasing power of 
money. Money inflation, pursued by government through sale of governmental 
securities to the central bank is actually a far less obvious way of financing 
extraordinary expenditures than straightforward increase in taxes imposed on 
economic subjects.
11 At the same time, it is vital for pelting government to 
disguise the real height of war costs because it is possible to consume formerly 
accumulated country wealth for war purposes (without evoking public 




Credit and deposit financial services 
 
Typical current monetary systems in developed countries are characterized 
by a legal monopoly of the central bank regarding to the currency, which isn’t by 
any way backed by a stock of precious metals (or other scarce resources) kept by 
this authority. These central banks issue monetary base (that means final money), 
which are used as means of circulation or which create commercial banks´ 
reserve.  
Fractional reserves of commercial banks are another special feature of 
today’s monetary systems. This means that monetary base in itself doesn’t 
represent the whole money supply and often not even its majority. In these 
systems, the rate of inside money is a decisive aspect, which is determined by the 
rate of so-called excess reserves, which banks offer to third parties in the form of 
bank credit. 
Discussing creation of inside money, it is important to split bank services into 
those of credit type and those of deposit type. From the point of view of money 
creation, credit operations aren’t relevant because these are the situations when 
the original owner of some amount of money gives up right of disposal with this 
financial sum for the stipulated period. This means that the amount of money 
given available to the bank by the original owner has merely one single owner at 
any moment. However, the situation is completely different in the case of deposit 
operations, when the owner of the amount of money entrusts the bank with his 
financial sum only in order to a custody, so he reserves his right of disposal to the 
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full extent. Thus, regardless of this situation, commercial bank treats this deposit 
as excess reserves, and its general majority in the form of credit makes over to 
third party.
13 Hereby from now on, two “owners” have the right of disposal with 
one financial sum, or more precisely, each of these bank contractual clients treats 
the same money to the full extent as if he would be its exclusive owner. This 
confidential obligation brings inside money into existence, and this constitutes 
outstanding debt of banking sector. There exists a category of “claim to inside 
money”, which means that each balance of account is mirrored by a financial 
commitment.
14  
It is evident that from the legal point of view, this makes for a radical 
discrepancy because the existence of full and exclusive proprietary is the 
fundamental presumption for concluding valid (and meaningful) contract. If in 
terms of deposit operation the bank deals with some part of the deposit as being 
its owner, even if all the time the rights of disposal belong to depositor of this 
money, then this creates a legal conflict. 
 
“One of the contract’s definition resulting from fundamental ownership is 
impossibility to assign more than one exclusive privilege of the same thing. 
The essence of ownership is its exclusive control. It is logical that only one 
person can do that exclusive control over one thing. As soon as the same right 
would be declared to someone other, the exclusiveness couldn’t be preserved. 
Even that is why a contract, which would determine, that two parties will at 




This discrepancy becomes fully evident in the case of a bank run on the 
bank
16. The commercial bank provided credit to the third party, thus the credit 
exceeds the pool of available excess reserves (received deposits) of this bank, and 
therefore the bank can never pay out all issued certificates for the underlying 
asset. It follows that for its owner, inside money is always connected with some 
risk. 
 
Creation of inside money 
 
As we mentioned above, if commercial banks aren’t obliged by law to keep 
100 % of deposited money as reserves in their vaults, they treat much of this 
financial asset as excess reserves. Accordingly, bank lends these (up to now 
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unproductive) funds to its clients in the form of credit paying interest. This brings 
significant savings in resource costs of money and therefore substantially 
increases competitiveness of this commercial bank.  
From the institutional point of view, inside money issue (which of course 
decreases purchasing power of money) is in the most of the developed countries 
limited only by the set of required reserves ratio (RRR)
17. Because of the low 
level of RRR (generally under 10 %)
18, for commercial banks the solvency and 
credibility of their clients to pay for credits is the only binding limit of money 
creation. Thus, if the commercial bank concludes that the expected return on 
project or its security for a debt (quality of banker's collaterals) covers the 
associated incremental costs, there is nothing to hinder the bank in its credit (and 
issuing) activity.  
In politically and economically stable environment, commercial banks will 
strive for steady rate of deposits reserves. Applying the law of large numbers, 
banks will try to keep dynamics of new credits equal to the dynamics of paying 
for previous credits.
19 In a consequence to this, inside money creation is a direct 
reflection of nominal demand for cash by non-financial institutions and 
households, which itself is a function of credibility of the banking system.  
In addition, this process of money creation works multiplicatively (originally 
uncovered deposits become credits and their new owners will deposit them to 
bank, which will again provide part of them as a credit on the financial market) 
and significantly contributes to instability of purchasing power of money. 
However, this cashless means constitute claim on public (not private) money, and 
that is why the commercial banks have no incentive not to go to the verge of 
acceptable risk in providing credit. Even if in (recent) history the purchasing 
power of the currency decreased because of this policy of commercial banks, 
paradoxically the credibility of any of these banks wasn´t undermined. 
 
Failure of incentives 
 
In the free-market, a success in competition process is the question of 
innovations and effectiveness. To reach maximum efficiency, the entrepreneur 
must be able to minimize all costs. However, incentives to cut costs diminish 
when the government in such a way regulates the market subject that profitability 
is not the entrepreneurial action, or in the case when this subject doesn’t bear all 
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costs and risks the consequences of its actions.
20 The second one is just the case of 
commercial banks that don’t bear responsibility for damaged purchasing power of 
money caused by their excessive issuing activity.  
As it follows from above-mentioned, reasons of this incentives’ failure must 
be seen in the institutional framework of the economics, dealing with this 
problem. Even when speaking about developed countries, the analyses of 
institutional aspect of their particular sectors usually conclude that long-term 
inefficiency can only be caused by stiff governmental regulation of these sectors. 
The same accounts for banking system. 
A suitable framework which prevents from this incentives failure is the 
system of free banking, or more precisely, framework of open competition of 
currencies issued by individual commercial banks.
21 Under the constraints of this 
competitive environment, the profit driven banks would in their self-interest keep 
the purchasing power of its currency stable or at least predictable in order to 
provide a desirable product (that is the private currency) to its customers. The 
decision-making process about the issuance of inside money wouldn’t be only the 
question of risk assessment and security for a debt of certain project, but only the 
stability of purchasing power of bank’s private currency would be pivotal. If the 
bank increased fiduciary money issuance above the level justified by market-
driven demand for its currency, in the long-run this would result into distrust and 
the bank would risk that its clients start to get rid of this private currency 
certificates – partly in the form of additional demand for goods and services, 
partly in the form of direct withdrawal of deposits (run on a bank). Bank’s private 
currency would become traded with discount and subsequently would subside to 
fulfil the role of money, and this would lead to reduction of shareholders value of 
issuing bank.
22 
Reconciliation of good reputation and confidence is an uneasy lengthy 
process. If the bank wanted to recover its market share, it would have to cut the 
amount of issued notes below the level of damaged demand for this currency. This 
would lead to a significant decrease in earnings, and consequently penalize bank 
for its previous excessive issuance.  
Contrary to apprehensions of many statists, it is hardly possible that under the 
system of free banking a persistent excessive issuance of notes and thus a 
continuing fluctuation of money stock would take place. A mechanism of 
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sanctions to those banks that would determine to issue more money than its 
demanded amount works here. If some of the private banks don’t respect these 
market boundaries of money expansion, they run a risk of worse (because of 
increased costs of liquidity) or even runs failure. Similarly, the bank that issues 






Assets in the form of final money are crucial part of money supply in a 
majority of developed monetary systems. Even if a central bank of the particular 
country has an exclusive right to issue money, it is able to influence the whole 
money stock only very indirectly, by means of redistribution processes. The most 
used tool of money supply regulation is discount rate, which, however, presumes 
high demand elasticity for money against interest rate.
24 Increase in money supply 
is then caused by the mechanism of money creation, whereas this increase is 
endogenous to a great extent. 
Even if today the biggest part of money supply is created just by inside 
money, it doesn’t change the fact that the strict note issuing monopoly 
(concerning money basis) limits free action of individuals, and mainly causes 
failure of incentives of commercial banks. The inside issuance of money that isn’t 
absorbed by increased demand for money devaluates the existing purchasing 
power of money, without undermining confidence to the bank that actually made 
this issue.  
The possibility of elimination of this failure can be seen in the free banking 
system, or more precisely, in such a monetary settlement where there is a chance 
for every bank to issue its own private currency. In this competitive environment 
every bank would have to consider its issuance activity, so that the additional 
increase of fiduciary funds denominated in its currency doesn’t undermine its´ 
clients confidence. Total monetary supply of banking institutions would then 
directly reflect a decision of optimising individuals (clients of these banks) to 
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